Appendix A: Verification and extensions
In the main text, we briefly summarized the main findings from our verification and extension exercise. In this section, we provide more detail about the procedure and results.
We verify and extend three studies linking non-tax revenue to autocratic instability. The first study uses Durable failure as the dependent variable to measure regime failure (Morrison 2009 ), while the second uses Archigos leader failure (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010) and the third uses DPI failure (Ahmed 2012) . In each study, the empirical analysis considers the stability of both dictatorships and democracies and we preserve this feature of the research design even though our main interest is in understanding how different measures of autocratic stability perform.
Non-tax revenue and Durable failure Morrison (2009) argues that non-tax revenue reduces the risk of political instability in both democracies and dictatorships. In democracies, ample non-tax revenue enables leaders to decrease taxes on the rich and thus lower the incentive of the rich to stage a coup. In dictatorships, leaders can use non-tax income to increase social spending on the poor and thereby lower their incentive to stage a democratic revolution. The measure of non-tax revenue in Morrison's study is total government expenditure less total tax revenue, and is comprised of foreign aid grants, revenue from state-owned enterprises, and other sources. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of Durable failure, and the sample excludes all cases where Durable failure occurs as a result of civil war (or interregnum periods). Table 3 in the original). The first column reports the verification; the coefficient estimate for non-tax revenue is -0.661 and statistically different from zero.
1 The second column examines democratic transitions, treating other types of instability events as right-censored. The estimate for non-tax revenue is larger in size than the original result and statistically significant. The next column looks at democratic failures and treats other instability events, including democratic transitions, as right-censored. Again the estimate for non-tax revenue is larger in size than the original result. This suggests that non-tax revenue reduces the risk of both transitions from autocracy to democracy and transitions from democracy to autocracy.
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The fourth column examines autocratic transition and consolidation events. The coefficient for non-tax revenue is now positive but not different from zero. This suggests that non-tax revenue does not reduce the risk of non-democratic instability events in this sample. The fifth column examines both democratic transitions and institutional liberalizations; the estimate for non-tax revenue is again negative and significant. The final column looks at both autocratic transition and consolidation events as well as institutional de-liberalization events. Again, there is no relationship between non-tax revenue and these forms of autocratic instability.
Figure A-1 illustrates the substantive findings. The dashed line shows the result from the verification model (column 1): moving across almost the full range of the revenue variable decrease the risk of all failures from roughly 4 percent to under 1 percent. However, this estimate is stronger for the risk of democratic transition (column 2), which drops from roughly 2.5 percent to less 0.5 percent across this range of revenue values. Finally, the estimate for autocratic transitions and consolidation (column 4) is slightly positive but substantively small.
These findings suggest that the main empirical result in Morrison's analysis pertains to democratic transition and democratic failure events but not to autocratic transition and consolidation events.
3 That is, non-tax revenue may reduce the risk of transitions to and from democracy but has little influence on the risk of transitions from one autocratic regime to another. These results fit the theoretical expectations in Morrison's (2007) Figure A-1: Non-tax revenue and Durable failure. The horizontal axis depicts the measure of non-tax revenue (rescaled) from the 5th to the 95th percentile of the revenue distribution, while the right vertical axis depicts the predicted probability of different types of Durable failure. Estimates from models in columns 1, 2, and 4 in Table A-1. follow from the threat of democratic revolution in autocracies and the threat of coups that topple democracies. Indeed, there is no outcome associated with autocracy-to-autocracy transitions in either Morrison's game or the Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) model upon which his analysis builds. In this class of theoretical models, the only risk to an autocratic regime arises from would-be democrats not from rebels or revolutionaries who would topple a dictatorship and replace it with another. So while Durable codes a number of distinct types of autocratic instability, only some of them are theoretically relevant in this study. Consistent with theoretical expectations, these Durable failures are the instability events that drive the empirical finding. Using Durable failure as a proxy for autocratic instability in this application only adds noise to the model but does not alter the main result, which rests on the correlation between non-tax revenue and democratic transitions.
Non-tax revenue and Leader failure
Next we examine two studies that use different measures of the same concept: leadership survival. The first, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010), uses leader data from Archigos; while the second, Ahmed (2012) employs a binary indicator of government failure from the DPI. Both studies find that free resources, such as non-tax revenue, oil exports, foreign aid, or worker remittances, reduce the risk leadership ouster and that this effect is stronger for leaders in small coalition regimes and autocratic polities. Therefore, both studies examine "free resources" or "unearned income" by interacting these variables with a measure of either coalition size (W) or level of autocracy (A).
The first study looks at three sources of government revenue: non-tax revenue (from Morrison (2009)), oil exports (share of GDP), and foreign aid (share of GDP). We focus on the non-tax revenue model (Model 2, Table 1 in the original) because this model yields the strongest evidence "that if small-coalition leaders gain access to additional free resources then their risk of deposition is reduced" (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010, 8) : the verification estimate for non-tax revenue is negative while the coefficient for the interaction between non-tax revenue and coalition size (W) is positive.
4 This study employs a Weibull survival model where the unit of analysis is the leader's time in power.
We categorize leadership failures into two bins: (1) those that coincide with a regime collapse; and (2) those that do not.
5 The former group of leader failures, which occur when the regime loses power, includes: military coups ousting democratically elected civilian leaders (e.g. Chile 1973 , Thailand 1991 ; leader ousters occurring when autocratic regime collapse is followed by a new democracy (e.g. Argentina 1983, South Africa 1994); and leader ousters occurring when one autocratic regime is replaced by another (e.g. Liberia 1980 , Pakistan 1977 . The sample includes 335 leadership failures but only 45 of these occur during regime collapses.
The second group of leader failures, which occur when the regime remains in power, include: most leader transitions in democracies; regular leader changes in autocratic regimes (e.g. Mexican elections every six years from 1976-1994); and some irregular leader transitions in autocratic regimes that do not entail regime collapse (e.g. the Argentine military's nonviolent rotation of junta leaders in the early 1980s). Table A -2 reports the results. The first column is the verification model (Table 1 , column 2 in the original): the estimate for N on − tax is negative and statistically different from zero, indicating non-tax revenue is correlated with a lower hazard. In the second column, which examines only leader failures where the regime loses power, this estimate is negative but substantially smaller in size. Column 3 examines leader failures when the regime remains in power and the estimate of interest is again negative and large.
Figure A-2 shows how the substantive result varies across these three models. 6 We call readers' attention to the relative change in the hazard resulting from an increase in non-tax revenue, not the absolute size of the hazard because the latter is influenced by the number of events in each category of leader transitions. The left panel depicts the change in the hazard for all leader failures. An increase in non-tax revenue of 10 percent of GDP is associated with a decrease in the hazard of roughly one-half. The middle panel depicts the result from the model that examines only leader failures that occur during regime transitions: the substantive result is substantially smaller, lowering the hazard at two years from roughly 0.0011 to 0.0009. Finally, the right panel depicts the result from the third column: again the increase in non-tax revenue cuts the hazard by more than one-half.
A second study, Ahmed (2012) , tests whether 'unearned' income from foreign aid and remittances influences government stability using data on leader failure from the DPI. The expectation is that unearned income lowers the risk of government failure and that this effect is stronger in autocratic countries than in democratic ones. The variables of interest are: (1) aid and remittances as a share of GDP; (2) the autocracy score, derived from the Polity index; and (3) the interaction of these two variables. Table A -3 reports the results that verify and extend the results from Table 3 of Ahmed (2012) . We concentrate on the model in column 2 that tests the interaction between Aid + Remit and Autocracy, and leave our verification and correction of the two-stage model for readers to assess with our replication files. Second, we address a concern that arises in the original analysis: the key interactive variable, Autocracy, is not properly lagged. Figure A-2: Non-tax revenue and leadership failure, by regime remaining in power. Hazard rates calculated from models reported in Table A -2. Horizontal axes depicts the leader time in power (in years). The vertical axes shows the estimated hazard rates for associated with a 10 percent (of GDP) increase in non-tax revenue, from 3 percent o 13 percent.
models presented here, we therefore present the results both before (columns 1-3) and after (columns 4-6) correcting this error. The bottom panel of Table A -3 reports the linear combination of the main coefficient of interest -β Aid+Remit + β Autocracy×(Aid+Remit) -at the 5th percentile and the 95th percentile of the in-sample distribution of the autocracy score. The first column is the verification of the original reported in column 2 of Table 3 . The coefficient for the interaction between Autocracy and Aid+Remit is negative and statistically different from zero. This estimate for Aid+Remit at low levels of the autocracy is 0.009, while this estimate is -0.066 at high levels of autocracy.
8 Thus, consistent with theoretical expectations, the combination of aid and remittances lowers the risk of government failure, but only at high levels of institutionalized autocracy.
Columns 2 and 3 report results from splitting the DPI government failures into: those when the regime loses power and those when the regime remains in power. This analysis mixes autocracies and democracies; and we preserve this research design by coding all autoPolity score jumps from -1 on December 31 1988 to +8 on December 31 1989, marking this democratic transition. The autocracy score used by Ahmed as an explanatory variable for the level of institutionalized autocracy falls from 0.1 to 0.05, which corresponds to a 9 point increase (from -1 to +8) in the Polity scale. Therefore, the same event -in this case the 1989 election of Aylwin -is captured in both the dependent variable and the independent variable for the observation year 1989. To correctly use information from the the Polity scale as an explanatory variable to examine when the government is likely to fail, this variable needs to be lagged one year to reflect this concept as coded for December 31 of the prior calendar year.
cratic regime failures in the GWF data set as incumbent regime losing power as well as all democracies that fail and transition back to autocracy. Government failures where the autocratic regime remains in power and where democracy continues uninterrupted are coded as the incumbent regime remaining in power.
9 The estimate for the interaction term in column 2 -for government failures where the incumbent regime loses power -is positive. The linear combination estimates in the bottom panel show that the coefficient for Aid + Remit is positive both at low levels of autocracy (0.036) and high levels of autocracy (0.056). Contrary to the theoretical expectations, this model suggests that aid and remittances increase the chances of government failures that coincide with regime transitions -for both democracy and autocracies.
The third column examines government failures when the incumbent regime remains in power, and the results parallel those reported in column 1 for all government failures. The results in columns 2 and 3 therefore suggest that the main finding in the original pertains to government failures when the incumbent group retains power. The final three columns repeat the analysis with the corrected autocracy score. This correction yields two further results. In column 4, which models all government failures, the interaction term is substantially smaller and not statistically different from zero. In column 5, the interaction term is strongly positive, and the estimated marginal effect of Aid + Remit in countries with a high autocracy score is now positive and statistically different from zero -the opposite of the theoretical prediction.
Figure A-3 shows the main results from both the original and corrected models, for countries with a high level of autocracy (0.5 on the transformed autocracy score). In the left panel, the estimate from the verification model suggests that increasing unearned income across the range lowers the risk of failure from roughly 10 percent to less than 1 percent. However, this estimate masks the strongly negative association between unearned income and failure risk when there is no regime collapse and the positive (but weak) association for government failure when the regime collapses. The short dashed line depicting this latter estimate shows that moving across this range of unearned income is associated with an increase in the risk of regime failure from 4.3 percent to 5.7 percent. The corrected model in the right panel illustrates the same patterns. The risk of government failures that coincides with regime collapse rises from under 3 percent to 5 percent -the opposite of the theoretical expectation.
The results from the verification and extension in Tables A-2 and A-3 indicate that the stabilizing effect of non-tax revenue in the models of all leader failures does not extend to leader failures that occur when autocratic regimes lose power. Rather, the evidence that non-tax revenue stabilizes autocracies only pertains to leader transitions that occur when the incumbent regime retains power. Further, there are many fewer leader failures that occur during regime changes than those that do not. This means that much of our confidence in models of leader failure, stems from the large number of leader transitions that occur when the incumbent ruling group rotates leaders but does not lose power.
While Bermeo (2015) points out a number of empirical issues with the analysis in Bueno 9 See Tables in Appendix C for a list of events for each type of government failure in the sample. Table A -3. Estimates in right panel from columns 4-6 in Table A-3. de Mesquita and Smith (2010) and Ahmed (2012) that make it difficult to interpret empirical findings using their data and modeling approaches, we offer one explanation that might account for a negative correlation between non-tax revenue and leader exit when the ruling regime or coalition remains in power: non-tax revenue or free resources may allow incumbents to pay regime supporters with resources to forestall attempts by regime insiders to oust the incumbent leader. Leader ouster by regime insiders (including many leadership reshuffling coups), we believe, is conceptually distinct from attempts by regime outsiders to replace the ruling regime or coalition. Regime insiders ousting a leader can be interpreted as accountability to the regime elite or regime supporters. In contrast, regime outsiders ousting a regime (in addition to its leader) from power can be interpreted as an attempt to replace the ruling coalition with another one, thus changing the composition of the group with access to power and the resources that come with it. Aksoy, Carter and Wright (2015, 423) , for example, "pinpoint the accountability of dictators to elites with an interest in preserving the regime" by introducing "a new distinction between coups that reshuffle the leadership but leave the regime intact, and regime change coups that replace the group of elites atop the regime." The former, they argue, "better capture whether elite supporters hold the dictator accountable because while reshuffling coups replace the leader, the core regime supporters still retain power." This measure uses DPI's YRSOFFC variable that records the number of years that the executive stayed in power: according to the DPI2012 codebook "years are counted in which the executive was in power as of January 1 or was elected but hadn't taken office as of January 1. Thus, a "1" is recorded in the year following his/her election." The end year of the executive tenure is often treated as government failure.
This measure largely corresponds to leadership failure, but the concept of "the executive" could be different from "the effective leader": "The executive who formally (de jure) holds power is counted." Archigos Leadership Failure The Archigos data set records when a leader, "the actual effective ruler" lost power. The EXIT variable shows whether and how a leader lost power: "It can take on the following values: -888 Leader still in power; 1 Leader lost power through regular means; 2 Leader died of natural causes while in power; 2.1 Leader retired due to ill health; 2.2 Leader lost office as a result of suicide; 3 Leader lost power through irregular means; 4 Leader deposed by another state."
Researchers often use this measure as a dichotomous variable indicating whether a leader stayed in office in a country-year. The information about the mode of exit is also used to distinguish between regular or irregular leadership failure: "Removal from office is coded as Regular when the leader is removed in accordance with explicit rules or established conventions of his or her particular country." "Removal from office is coded as Irregular when the leader was removed in contravention of explicit rules and established conventions." Regime Failure (1946 -2010 An autocratic regime-year is coded as failure when the executive or the governing body is replaced by a person or a group of people from other factions significantly different from the former: the means of replacement could be a competitive election, a coup, mass uprising, civil war, or some peaceful institutional changes that ensure significant changes in the composition of the ruling group.
GWF
For researchers who are interested in whether the ruler or the ruling elites actually lost power followed by changes in domestic institutions or political environments, this measure is useful because it distinguishes between institutional changes and regime instability.
This appendix details the coding rules used to delineate different types of political change events for each of the three variables (Polity Durable, Archigos leader failure, and DPI government turnover). The coding rules for the autocratic regime collapse events in the GWF data are available in the codebook: http://dictators.la.psu.edu/. The code book also contains brief narratives describing each regime collapse event in the data set.
Polity Durable
(1) Democratic transitions -Durable failures that occur the same year as the following GWF transitions:
autocracy-to-provisional; provisional-to-democracy; autocracy-to-democracy - (1) Democratic survival Democratic regime remains in power, but leadership fails.
-Archigos leadership failures that occur in country-years in which GWF regime type is democracy or provisional, and the subsequent year is also coded as the same.
(2) Democratic failure Democratic regime collapses and leadership also fails.
-Archigos leadership failures that occur in country-years in which GWF regime type is democracy or provisional, and the subsequent year is coded as autocracy.
(Not included in this type of Archigos failure are cases in which events of GWF democratic failure do not entail Archigos leadership failure: e.g., Peru 1992 when Fujimori closed the Congress) (3) Democratic Transition Autocratic regime collapses and leadership fails too.
-Archigos leadership failures that occur in country-years in which GWF regime type is autocracy, but the subsequent year is coded as democracy or provisional.
(4) Autocratic failure One form of autocracy transforms into another.
-Archigos leadership failures that occur in country-years in which GWF regime type is autocracy, but the subsequent country-year is neither democracy nor provisional (e.g., transition from personalist to party regime in Nicaragua 1979).
(5) Autocratic survival Autocratic regime remains in power, but leadership fails.
-Archigos leadership failures that occur in country-years in which a particular type of GWF autocracy remains in the subsequent year.
(-88)
-Archigos leadership failures that occur in country-years not included in the GWF data set (e.g. Belize)
-Archigos leadership failures that occur in the years of civil war, foreign occupation, or provisional government (e.g. Afghanistan 1996)
DPI government turnover
(1) Democratic survival Democracy survives, but the executive fails.
-DPI government turnovers that occur in country-years in which GWF regime type is democracy or provisional, and the subsequent year is also coded as the same.
(2) Democratic failure Both democracy and the executive fail.
-DPI government turnovers that occur in country-years in which GWF regime type is democracy or provisional, and the subsequent year is coded as autocracy.
(Not included in this category of DPI failures are cases in which events of GWF democratic failure do not entail DPI government turnover: e.g., Zambia 1996 when the President prohibited the participation of the most influential opposition candidate) (3) Democratic Transition Both autocratic regime and the executive fail.
-DPI government turnovers that occur in country-years in which GWF regime type is autocracy, but the subsequent year is coded as democracy or provisional.
-DPI government turnovers that occur in country-years in which GWF regime type is autocracy, but the subsequent country-year is neither democracy nor provisional (e.g., transition from personalist to military regime in Haiti 1986).
(5) Autocratic survival Autocratic regime remains in power, but the executive fails.
-DPI government turnovers that occur in country-years in which a particular type of GWF autocracy remains in the subsequent year.
-DPI government turnovers that occur in country-years not included in the GWF data set (e.g. Jamaica)
-DPI government turnovers that occur in country-years of civil war, foreign occupation, or provisional government (e.g. Liberia 1994) Regime collapse is defined as Autocracy-to-Autocracy, Autocracy-toDemocracy, or Democracy-to-Autocracy. Non-missing observations only. Regime collapse is defined as Autocracy-to-Autocracy, Autocracy-toDemocracy, or Democracy-to-Autocracy. Non-missing observations only. In this section, we examine the political changes in two countries, Iraq and Nepal, to illustrate when these three measures capture the same events and when they do not. Figure D- 10 The political events captured by these changes are important for measuring autocratic instability but they do not constitute Durable failures because they do not entail a change of 3 points or more on the combined index. The only Durable failure occurs in 2003, the result of foreign invasion and not changes in domestic politics.
In contrast, the GWF measure of autocratic regime collapse captures the 1958 coup which ends the monarchy and results in the death of the royal family. This coup and political transition constitutes regime change, according to their coding rules, because a new group of elites -based in the military -rules Iraq. Similarly, GWF mark the 1968 coup as autocratic regime failure because the Ba'thists regained power that year, and excluded non-Ba'thists associated with the Aref regime. The post-1968 al-Bakr regime is distinct from the previous one because the group from which top leaders could be chosen and who could influence policy was limited to Ba'thists, who had been excluded from the earlier regime not long after the seizure of power Haddad (1971, 143-144, 157-64) . Finally, GWF code the formal transfer of power from Field Marshal al-Bakr to Hussein in 1979 as autocratic regime change because it completed a gradual shift from a regime based mostly on Ba'thist military officers and the Ba'th party to one in which the group of leaders included few outside of Hussein's family and home region (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 1987, 208-13; Brooker 1997, 115-16) .
While Polity captures changes in political institutions and GWF changes in the ruling group, DPI focuses on leadership turnover. Thus, 1979 is coded as a year of government turnover due to leadership changes from al-Bakr to Hussein. This event also constitutes autocratic regime failure, but the leadership change itself is not a sufficient reason to code regime failure while it is sufficient for the DPI's government turnover variable.
Nepal's history illustrates further differences among Polity, GWF, and DPI. GWF code Nepal as two separate autocratic regimes during the post-war period. For over a century , the Rana family dominated Nepal as hereditary prime ministers. They marginalized the monarchy and controlled all branches of government. In 1951, however, they were forced to return executive power to the king by an insurgency and demonstrations (Levi 1952, 185-91; Heitzman 1991) . In 1990, the monarchy agreed to constitutional changes and multi-party election, which was won by the opposition in 1991, marking the end of the regime.
Polity Durable records five instability years prior to the 1990-91 democratic transition. The first four (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) involve changes in the Polity score that capture a series of democ- ratization efforts, including the first national elections in 1959. Mass anti-government protest and civil disobedience in 1957-58 precipitated the King's announcement of these elections, and Polity codes these years as transitional (-88) . In 1960, however, the regime destroyed these democratizing efforts. As Heitzman (1991) describes, "with the army's support and with little warning, the king used his emergency powers to dismiss the cabinet and arrest its leaders." Even though the regime made initial efforts to appease discontent, the King never lost power. Thus, these instances of Durable failure are not coded as autocratic regime failures by GWF. The final Durable failure prior to democratic transition entailed a limited liberalization process culminating in national elections in 1981. The monarchy remained in power, however. Finally, Polity Durable and GWF agree on coding democratic transition in 1991 (though Polity marks this in 1990, not 1991), democratic failure in 2002, and democratic transition again in 2006.
Between 1975 and 1990, however, there are three DPI failures, all involving changes in the leadership of Prime Minister rather than any other changes in political institutions or the ruling monarchy. For the same reason, during the period of democratic rule between 1991 and 2002, there are five DPI failures. In sum, a monarchy ruled Nepal until the democratic transition of 1990-91 democratization -an event captured in all the data sets. In addition, Polity Durable codes several failed democratization attempts, while the DPI codes eight leadership changes that do not entail regime change.
5 Appendix E: Extended discussion of Ahmed (2012) This appendix first discusses the measure of the level of autocracy (Autocracy Score) in Ahmed's (2012) analysis, focusing on two points: (1) the Autocracy Score is a transformation of the quasi-continuous, equal interval Polity scale; and (2) the Autocracy Score is not correctly lagged. Changes to correct either of these yields null results for the main empirical test in Table 3 of the original article.
This appendix then extends the two-stage models in Table 4 of the original manuscript. In attempting to verify these models, we note that the original specification did not include the constituent terms of the key interaction variable.
The Autocracy Score
The autocracy score in this analysis is defined as the "inverse of a country's adjusted POLITY score."
11 In addition to inverting the conventional 21-point scale and constraining the values to fall between 0 and 1, Ahmed transforms the quasi-continuous variable to give more weight to changes in the Polity index at the autocratic end of the index. For example, a 1-point increase in the Polity index from -10 to -9 translates into a decrease in the adjusted autocracy score from 1 to 0.5, but a 10-point increase in the Polity scale from 0 to 10 translates into a decrease from 0.091 to 0.047 in the adjusted autocracy score. Figure E -1 plots the adjusted autocracy score against the standard Polity index, showing the data transformation. Though there is no mention of this adjustment in Ahmed (2012) , in unreported results we find that this transformation accounts for the main results in Tables 3 and 4 of the original analysis. However, there are well-known problems associated with assuming that each onepoint change in the Polity index is equivalent, and this particular issue is not germane to our discussion of measures of autocratic instability. Therefore, following Ahmed, we use the transformed index (i.e. the vertical axis in Figure 1 ) throughout.
Two-stage models
Next we turn to the two-stage instrumental variable models in Table 4 of the original analysis. We concentrate on the model reported in column 3, which uses an instrumental variable -M uslim × Oil -to predict values for the interaction between Autocracy and Aid + Remit. To obtain maximum likelihood convergence using a two-stage approach, Ahmed changes the model specification by substituting duration time polynomials for duration time dummies and substituting geographic region dummies for country dummies. The first column of Table E-1 reports the verification of column 3, Table 4 in Ahmed's analysis. The coefficient estimate for the interaction term is negative and statistically different from zero. Ahmed interprets this estimate as "captur[ing] the heterogeneous effect of unearned foreign income in autocracies (at varying degrees) on government turnover" (159). However, this model does not include the constituent terms of the interaction (Autocracy and Aid + Remit). Importantly, the interaction term and the autocracy score are positively correlated by construction, and the autocracy score is negatively correlated with government failure. This means that a large negative effect of the interaction term may be picking up the independent (negative) influence of the autocracy score when the latter is not included as a control variable. Thus, to estimate the influence of Aid + Remit on the risk of government failure conditional on Autocracy, we need to test a model that includes the interaction term and both constituent terms. To do this requires including two endogenous variables, Aid + Remit and Autocracy × (Aid + Remit), in the outcome equation. To identify the two-stage equations, we therefore need an additional excluded instrument. We use the interaction between the autocracy score and the excluded instrument: Autocracy × (M uslim × Oil).
Before estimating the two-stage model with two endogenous variables, however, we first test the verification model in the first column using the corrected autocracy score to calculate the interaction term. This result is reported in column (2), and the coefficient estimate is nearly identical to that in the first column. Next, we change the model specification to make it more parsimonious so that we can obtain maximum likelihood convergence in a model with two endogenous regressors.
12 Column 3 reports the estimate from this more parsimonious model, with little change to the estimate for the interaction term. Thus, correcting the autocracy score and testing a more parsimonious model preserves the twostage result reported by Ahmed for the interaction.
Using this more parsimonious specification, column 4 reports the instrumental variables result while controlling for the autocracy score and including two endogenous regressors. The coefficient estimate for the interaction term in this model is still negative but much closer to zero and not statistically significant. This suggests that model mis-specificationi.e. not including the constituent terms when testing an interaction -accounts for the main two-stage result.
The final two columns report results for the corrected interaction specification with two endogenous variables, but separately examine government failure when the incumbent regime loses power and when it remains in power. The estimate for the interaction in column 5 (lose power) is positive and significant -the opposite of the theoretical prediction. The estimate for the marginal effect of unearned income in highly autocratic regimes, shown in the bottom panel, is positive but small (0.022). The estimate in democratic regimes is negative and statistically significant. This suggests that if we have the proper model specification, unearned income may only stabilize democracies. The final column estimates a model of government turnover when the incumbent regime remains in power; the estimate of interaction term is in the expected direction (negative) but much smaller than estimate in columns (1) to (3). These results confirm findings from the naive verification models in the main text: the main empirical finding for unearned income and government turnover pertains to the category of turnover events where the incumbent regime remains in power.
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6 Appendix F: Uncertainty around the estimates This section presents 95% confidence intervals around the point estimates for models extending Morrison (2009) and Ahmed (2012 Non-tax revenue per capita (1000's)
Figure F-1: Non-tax revenue and Durable failure. The confidence intervals are calculated using the estimates from models in columns 1, 2, and 4 in Aid + Remit (%GDP) Figure F -2: Unearned income and government failure, using uncorrected autocracy score. The confidence intervals are calculated using the estimates from columns 1-3 in Table A -3. The horizontal axis depicts the measure of unearned income from the 5th to the 95th percentile of the distribution; the vertical axis depicts the estimated risk of different types of government failure.
7 Appendix G: Extension using Svolik's Ruling Coalition Data
In this section, we extend the three studies (Morrison 2009; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010; Ahmed 2012 ) linking non-tax revenue to regime/leadership breakdown using Svolik's ruling coalition data. We maintain the research designs of these studies, but examine how the results change incorporating the information about autocratic ruling coalition status into the coding of dependent variables.
13 Since Svolik's data do not provide information about non-autocratic regime years, we can neither determine regime types nor identify cases of ruling coalition failure during non-autocratic regime spells. Thus we follow the GWF coding rule for regime failure during non-autocratic spells, while splitting regime/leadership failures during autocratic regime spells into those when the incumbent ruling coalition loses power and those when the ruling coalition remains in power.
To juxtapose the extension results in this section with those using the GWF data in Appendix A, we first show that autocratic regime failure events in the GWF data set closely match cases of ruling coalition failure in the Svolik data set, thus expecting similar results from our extension analysis. We find that 97 percent of GWF regime collapse country-years entail ruling coalition transition, while 86 percent of country-years with ruling-coalition changes also entail GWF autocratic regime collapse. Table  3 in the original). The first column replicates Morrison's base model. The second column examines durable failures accompanied with ruling coalition failure, 14 and the third column examines durable failures when the incumbent ruling coalition remains in power. In all three models, non-tax revenue appears to decrease the chances of regime failures.
15 Substantively, however, Figure G-1 shows that the regime-stabilizing effect of non-tax revenue appears to be greater when the ruling coalition remains in power than when the coalition loses power, which is somewhat consistent with the results of other extension analysis.
13 See Appendix A for details about theoretical arguments, research designs, and empirical findings of these studies.
14 About 83 percent of democratic transitions in Svolik's data involve ruling coalition transition. 15 To normalize the original non-tax revenue variable and minimize the influence of outliers, we log the non-tax revenue variable twice and rerun the models in columns 2 and 3. Then, we find results that are quite similar to those reported in Table A-1: i.e., non-tax revenue reduces the likelihood of durable failure that involves ruling coalition transition, such as most cases of democratization. Figure G-1: Non-tax revenue and Durable failure. The horizontal axis depicts the measure of non-tax revenue (rescaled) from the 5th to the 95th percentile of the revenue distribution, while the right vertical axis depicts the predicted probability of different types of Durable failure. Estimates from models in columns 1, 2, and 3 in Table G -2.
Non-tax revenue and Leader failure
Next, we examine two studies (Bueno de Mesquita 2010; Ahmed 2012) that use Archigos leadership failure and DPI government turnover as the proxies of leadership failure. We extend these studies by decomposing the proxies into cases where the incumbent ruling coalition remains in power and those where the ruling coalition collapses. We first replicate Model 2, Table 1 in Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) that examines the effect of non-tax revenues on leadership duration. The original model in column 1, Table  G -3 shows that the coefficient estimate for non-tax revenue is negative while the coefficient for the interaction between non-tax revenue and coalition size (W) is positive, indicating that non-tax revenue reduces the hazard of leadership failure, and much more so in small winning coalition systems. Then, we divide leadership failures into two categories: (1) those that coincide with a ruling coalition collapse in column 2; and (2) those that do not in column 3. The results show that leadership-stabilizing effect of non-tax revenue is insignificant for leader failures when the ruling coalition loses power. For leader failures when the ruling coalition remains in power, the estimate of non-tax revenue is negative and significant, and the interaction term is positive and significant, which is largely consistent with the results in column 1. Figure G-2 shows how the substantive effect of non-tax revenue varies across these three models. Again, the results are quite similar to those using GWF regime failure in Figure A2 .
The left panel shows the change in the hazard of all leader failures. A ten percent increase in non-tax revenue as a percentage of GDP (from 3 to 13 percent) decreases the hazard by about one-half. The middle panel shows the result from the model that examines only leader failures entailing ruling coalition failures: the substantive effect of non-tax revenue is almost negligible. Finally, the right panel shows the substantive result from the third column: the increase in non-tax revenue reduces the hazard by more than one-half.
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. Figure G-2: Non-tax revenue and leadership failure, by regime remaining in power. Hazard rates calculated from models reported in Table G -3. Horizontal axes depicts the leader time in power (in years). The vertical axes shows the estimated hazard rates for associated with a 10 percent (of GDP) increase in non-tax revenue, from 3 percent o 13 percent.
Next, we replicate and extend Model 2, Table 3 of Ahmed (2012) that examines whether 'unearned' income from foreign aid and remittances, along with the interaction between Aid+ Remit and Autocracy, influences government stability using data on government turnover from the DPI. Table G-4 reports the results with (columns 1-3) and without (columns 4-6) correcting the Autocracy score.
16 The bottom panels of Table G -4 report the linear combination of the main coefficients of interest -β Aid+Remit + β Autocracy×(Aid+Remit) -at the 5th percentile and the 95th percentile of the in-sample distribution of the autocracy score.
The first column replicating the original study shows that the coefficient estimate for the interaction between Autocracy and Aid + Remit is negative and statistically different from zero, indicating that Aid + Remit has negative effect on the risk of government turnover in highly autocratic countries. In columns 2 and 3, we split the DPI government failures into: those when the autocratic ruling coalition collapses and those when the autocratic ruling coalition remains in power. The estimate for the interaction term in column 2 -for government failures where the incumbent coalition loses power -is negative and insignificant. The 16 See Appendix E for detailed discussion on this correction. linear combination estimates in the bottom panel show that the coefficient for Aid + Remit is positive only at low levels of autocracy. This result suggests that aid and remittances do not decrease the chances of government failures that coincide with coalition failures. The third column examines government failures when the ruling coalition remains in power, and the results show that aid and remittances reduce the risk of government turnover when the ruling coalition remains in power only in autocracies. These results indicate that the leadership-stabilizing effect of non-tax revenues is significant when the ruling group retains power. Similarly, columns 4 to 6 using the corrected autocracy score show that aid and remittances decrease the chances of government failures only when autocratic ruling coalitions remain in power. The results from the verification and extension in Tables G-3 and G-4 indicate that the leadership-stabilizing effect of non-tax revenue is not significant when ruling coalitions lose power. Conversely, the findings in the original models appear to pertain to leadership failures when the ruling group remains in power. This finding is largely consistent with those using the GWF regime coding reported in Appendix A.
